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Part III
Frontiers of Privacy

Text Message Privacy:
Who Else Is Reading This?
Gerald Chan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Who talks on the phone anymore? Many of us perhaps. But we do so
far less than we did 10 to 15 years ago. And we are increasingly relying
on text conversations — whether through Short Message Service
(“SMS”) messaging, e-mail or some other “app” — as our primary mode
of communication. A 2014 Gallup poll found that Americans under the
age of 50 text more than they talk on their cell phones.1 Canadians are
unlikely to be much different, and the numbers have almost certainly
moved further in the direction of texting over the last four years.
It is easy to see why texting has exploded in popularity. As a mode of
communication, texting can be more efficient, allowing us to stretch out
a series of conversations over a 16-hour work day without taking too
much time from our daily checklist. Texting is also, in many ways, the
most private form of communication. No one has any idea who we are
communicating with (or if we are communicating at all) when we sit in
the corner of a crowded room and tap away on our phones.
Of course, the law lags behind technology. Texting has been popular
for over a decade, yet the Supreme Court of Canada did not address the
issue of text message privacy until December 8, 2017, when it released
R. v. Marakah2 and R. v. Jones.3 In these cases, the Court clarified the
law on when the state can access our private text communications and
the scope of our protections under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and
*
Partner, Stockwoods LLP. The Author and his partner, Nader R. Hasan, were counsel to
the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, which intervened in Marakah and Jones. An
abbreviated version of this chapter previously appeared on “Robichaud’s Criminal Defence
Litigation” blog (“Text Message Privacy: Where We Are and Where We Are Going”) and The
Advocates’ Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2018) (“Text messaging: The most private (and
recorded) form of communication”).
1
Frank Newport, “The New Era of Communication Among Americans” Gallup (November 10,
2014), online: <http://news.gallup.com/poll/179288/new-era-communication-americans.aspx>.
2
[2017] S.C.J. No. 59, 2017 SCC 59 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marakah”].
3
[2017] S.C.J. No. 60, 2017 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jones”].
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Freedoms.4 In Marakah, the majority held that both parties to a text
conversation have a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents
regardless of the device the police search. In Jones, the Court clarified
that the police require a production order to obtain historical text
messages from a service provider such as TELUS, as opposed to a more
rigorous Part VI5 (wiretap) authorization when obtaining text messages
on a prospective basis. These cases are summarized in this paper, along
with an analysis of unresolved issues and the future Supreme Court cases
that might address them.

II. JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
In the Charter, the right to privacy is protected by the section 8 right
to be “secure against unreasonable search or seizure”. The state conducts
a “search”, the courts have held, when it invades an area in which we
have a “reasonable expectation of privacy”.6 This can occur when the
state enters our physical spaces such as our homes (territorial privacy),
inspects our bodies (bodily privacy), or obtains “personal information
which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to
maintain and control from dissemination to the state”7 (informational
privacy).8 Where an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has
been invaded, she or he has standing to challenge the invasion as an
unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter and seek
the remedy of exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).
Since 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada has applied these principles
to the digital world in a series of cases. In R. v. Morelli,9 R. v. Cole,10 R. v.
Vu11 and R. v. Fearon,12 the Court clarified the law on when police can
search the contents of our digital devices (both personal and, in the case
of Cole, workplace devices). In R. v. Spencer,13 the Court looked at the
reasonable expectation of privacy that we have in our online activities, as
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
5
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
6
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No 63, 2004 SCC 67, at para. 18 (S.C.C.).
7
Id., at para. 25.
8
Id., at paras. 22-24.
9
[2010] S.C.J. No. 8, 2010 SCC 8 (S.C.C.).
10
[2012] S.C.J. No. 53, 2012 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”].
11
[2013] S.C.J. No. 60, 2013 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”].
12
[2014] S.C.J. No. 77, 2014 SCC 77 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”].
13
[2014] S.C.J. No. 43, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”].
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revealed by Internet service providers when they disclose to police the
customer name and address information associated with a particular
Internet protocol (“IP”) address.
Until Marakah, however, the Court had not examined how section 8
of the Charter applies to text messaging as its own unique category of
information. The closest it came was in R. v. TELUS Communications
Co.,14 when it interpreted the wiretapping regime in the Criminal Code
(Part VI) to apply to the “interception” of text messages and not just
phone calls. The Court reached this conclusion because Part VI speaks of
intercepting “private communications”, which can include voice and text
communications. TELUS, however, was a case of statutory construction
and not constitutional law.
Therefore, the stakes were high in Marakah and Jones. State access to
text messaging raises unique concerns because it implicates not just
privacy, but also expressive freedom. As Dickson C.J.C. wrote in
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, “the freedoms of
conscience, thought and belief are particularly engaged in a private
setting.”15 Private communications are where we experiment with
embryonic ideas, share our intimate thoughts, and express our rawest
emotions. If the state is granted access to this category of information too
easily, that “might well smother that spontaneity — reflected in
frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse — that liberates
daily life.”16

III. MARAKAH — TEXT MESSAGES ON THE RECIPIENT’S PHONE
The precise issue in Marakah was whether an individual can retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his/her text messages once they are
sent to and received on another person’s device. This is a question of
standing. Put another way, if A sends a text message to B, and the police
discover that text message during a search of B’s phone, does A have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search? Writing on
behalf of a five-judge majority, McLachlin C.J.C. said “yes”. (Justice
Moldaver dissented, with Côté J. joining him.)

14

[2013] S.C.J. No. 16, 2013 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TELUS”].
[1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, at para. 77 (S.C.C.).
16
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 42 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Duarte”], quoting from Harlan J. dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
15

72

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Chief Justice McLachlin reached this conclusion by applying the
well-established “totality of the circumstances” test. The first factor of
this test is the “subject matter of the search”. This is where the Crown
and defence typically fight over the framing of the issue.
One way to view the issue in Marakah is to view the subject matter of
the search as being the recipient’s phone. In this way, Marakah is all
about the search of a device, and only the owner or user of that device
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. Chief Justice
McLachlin rejected that view.17 Instead, she described the “subject matter
of the search” as “... Mr. Marakah’s ‘electronic conversation’ with
Mr. Winchester”.18 She focused on text messages as a unique category of
information, and focused on the substance of the information sought
rather than the physical place in which it is found. She viewed this as a
case of informational privacy rather than territorial privacy.
Characterizing the subject matter of the search as an “electronic
conversation” set the stage for the rest of McLachlin C.J.C.’s analysis. A
conversation requires at least two parties. Each has an equal interest in
the conversation and each may have an equal expectation that it will
remain private regardless of whose phone is searched by the police. The
only question, then, is whether this expectation is reasonable.
The remainder of the factors in the “totality of the circumstances” test
address this question of “reasonableness”. Two of these factors featured
prominently in the Crown’s submissions: the “place of the search” and
the “control” exercised by the accused. These factors are critical in
“territorial privacy” cases, where the focus is on the physical space in
which items are found: e.g., if the place is a dwelling, a high expectation
of privacy is reasonable, but only for those who can control access to the
dwelling like its residents.19 Had McLachlin C.J.C. accepted that
the subject of the search was the recipient’s device (a physical location),
the application of these factors would have been straightforward. But
because she characterized the subject of the search as the electronic
conversation between the sender and recipient, the application of the
factors had to be adapted to the informational privacy context.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s opinion is a textbook example of how to
conduct a context-appropriate analysis. The “place of the search”, she
wrote, could be viewed as being the private electronic space that text
17

Marakah, supra, note 2, at para. 16.
Id., at para. 17.
19
Note that this principle may be revisited in R. v. Le, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 34 (S.C.C.)
(appeal from [2018] O.J. No. 359, 2018 ONCA 56 (Ont. C.A.)) [hereinafter “Le”].
18
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messaging creates for the two parties to the conversation.20 Meanwhile,
“control” in the informational privacy context should be understood as
the freedom of individuals to choose how, when, and to whom they
disclose their information.21 In the context of text messaging, individuals
choose to disclose their private information to the recipient of the text
message. That is a necessary part of engaging in the act of
communication. While they lose “control” over the text message vis-àvis the recipient, that should not result in them giving up their privacy
rights in that communication vis-à-vis the rest of the world (and
especially the state).22 This analysis flowed directly from the way that
McLachlin C.J.C. characterized the issue at the outset of her analysis.
Next, McLachlin C.J.C. set her sights on the most important factor in
informational privacy cases: the nature of the information sought. The
more private and revealing the information, the more likely it will attract
constitutional protection. Here, McLachlin C.J.C. could have accepted an
analogy that the Crown drew in its submissions: text messages are
similar to letters. This analogy favoured the Crown because the sender of
a letter does not retain any reasonable expectation of privacy in the letter
once it is sent and received by the recipient. Only the recipient of the
letter, in whose possession it lies, has standing to challenge an
unconstitutional search and seizure of the letter.
Such backward-looking analogies, however, often fail to do justice to
the true power of new technologies. Fortunately for the defence in
Marakah, the Supreme Court had rejected similarly inapt comparisons in
other cases. In Vu, the Court held that computers are not four-drawer
filing cabinets.23 In Fearon, the Court noted that cell phones are not
briefcases.24 And in Marakah, the Court effectively held (although it did
not explicitly state) that text messages are not letters. Letters take days to
be delivered to their recipient. One can meaningfully characterize a letter
as having been “sent” once it is placed in the mail. Text messages, in

20

Marakah, supra, note 2, at para. 28.
Id., at para. 39.
22
Id., at para. 40. To have held otherwise would have been to revive the long-discredited
“risk analysis”: the notion that we abandon all reasonable expectation of privacy whenever we run
the risk that others might disseminate our private information. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
(and wisely) rejected this doctrine: Marakah, id., at para. 68; Cole, supra, note 10, at para. 76. This
doctrine would be especially destructive of privacy in the digital world where there is always the risk
that information will be leaked beyond our intended audience.
23
Vu, supra, note 11, at para. 24.
24
Fearon, supra, note 12, at para. 51.
21
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contrast, are never simply “sent”. Instead, they are part of an ongoing,
dynamic dialogue that may continue indefinitely. Their instantaneous
transmission allows for their conversational use.
Not only are text messages different from letters, but they are also
different from non-written forms of communication in that they are more
discreet. Individuals do not have to be in the same space to text message
(and almost never are) and therefore do not run the risk of being seen
together. Moreover, unlike phone conversations, text messaging allows
individuals to communicate with others in complete privacy even while
“in plain sight”. As McLachlin C.J.C. put it colourfully:
… A wife has no way of knowing that, when her husband appears to be
catching up on emails, he is in fact conversing by text message with a
paramour. A father does not know whom or what his daughter is
texting at the dinner table. Electronic conversations can allow people to
communicate details about their activities, their relationships, and even
their identities that they would never reveal to the world at large, and to
enjoy portable privacy in doing so.25

In light of all this, McLachlin C.J.C. concluded that individuals can
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages
regardless of where the messages are discovered. Therefore, a sender of a
text message may have standing to challenge an unconstitutional search
of the recipient’s device where that search revealed the sender’s text
messages. In most cases, the search will be unconstitutional unless police
first obtain a warrant (or some other type of judicial authorization).26
This is as it should be. Text messaging may be, in many ways, the most
discreet form of communication; but it is also the most recorded. By virtue
of the technological medium used, text messaging creates at least two
copies of each communication exchanged: one on the sender’s phone and
one on the recipient’s phone.27 As a result, nearly all of us are walking
around with transcripts of years’-worth of private communications in our
smartphones at all times. Even if we delete messages from our devices, they

25

Marakah, supra, note 2, at para. 36.
There are exceptions to the warrant requirement. If police conduct a lawful arrest, then
they are entitled to conduct a limited search of the arrestee’s smartphone upon arrest, including a
review of recently sent or received text messages: Fearon, supra, note 12, at para. 76. Police can
also conduct warrantless searches where there are exigent circumstances. In addition, individuals can
waive their s. 8 rights by consenting to police searches.
27
As illustrated in the companion appeal of Jones, supra, note 3, copies of text messages
are also sometimes retained by the telecommunications service provider.
26
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can be recovered forensically.28 This makes it especially important for the
law to step in and protect our text communications from disclosure to the
state absent compliance with the Charter.
Marakah will have significant implications for how police conduct
criminal investigations. The facts of Marakah concerned SMS text
messages; but McLachlin C.J.C. made it clear that her reasoning would
apply equally to other types of person-to-person communications tools,
such as Apple iMessage, Google Hangouts, and Blackberry Messenger.29
Indeed, one can easily extend this same reasoning to e-mails. While emails are sometimes used for lengthier and more formal communications
than those found in text messages, that is not always the case. For many
people, the decision of whether to send a message via SMS text
messaging or e-mail turns on nothing more than which “app” they
happen to click on first when they open their smartphone.
To be fair, McLachlin C.J.C. was careful to state that the exchange of
electronic messages will not always attract a reasonable expectation of
privacy.30 But attention must be paid to the end of her opinion where she
clarified this caveat with a few examples:
… This is not to say, however, that every communication occurring
through an electronic medium will attract a reasonable expectation of
privacy and hence grant an accused standing to make arguments
regarding s. 8 protection. This case does not concern, for example,
messages posted on social media, conversations occurring in crowded
Internet chat rooms, or comments posted on online message boards.31

A fair reading of these passages suggests that McLachlin C.J.C.
intended to exclude from her opinion the types of communications that
are exchanged in the electronic equivalent of the public square. One-toone text messages, however, should generally attract a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the post-Marakah world. The manner in which
McLachlin C.J.C. applied the totality of the circumstances factors (e.g.,
place of the search, control) would apply equally to all one-to-one
communications.
Some of the post-Marakah commentary has focused on the fact that
Mr. Marakah asked the recipient (Mr. Winchester) to delete the text
message from his phone, and tried to argue that this distinguishes the text
28
29
30
31

Vu, supra, note 11, at para. 43.
Marakah, supra, note 2, at para. 18.
Id., at para. 5.
Id., at para. 55.
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messages in this case as being more private than text messages in other
cases. However, McLachlin C.J.C. relied on this fact solely to establish a
subjective expectation of privacy, which is not a “high hurdle”.32 The
bulk of the section 8 work is done when determining whether the accused
has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. In this part of the
analysis, the fact that Mr. Marakah asked Mr. Winchester to delete the
messages played no role.
Finally, even in the case of group chats, a strong argument can be
made that all participants in the chat enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Many individuals use WhatsApp, for example, to participate in
group chats with others in defined social circles (e.g., high school
friends). Just because more than one person is involved does not mean
that the participants lose all expectation of privacy. R. v. Wong provides
the best support for this proposition.33 In that case, the appellant and 10
others were charged with keeping a common gaming house for operating
a private gambling session in a hotel room. The police surreptitiously
videotaped the operation. In the majority opinion, La Forest J. held that
the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the activities in
the hotel room even though more than two people were involved and
even though the public was invited to join the session. If this is true of
the activities of a hotel room, then it should equally be true of the
communications within a group chat.

IV. JONES — TEXT MESSAGES ON THE SERVER OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDER
The companion case of Jones raised a more technical question: where
the police are obtaining historical text messages from the servers of a
third party service provider such as TELUS (as opposed to the recipient’s
phone), what type of court order do they need? An ordinary production
order (for which the standard is the default test for reasonableness under
section 8 of the Charter: reasonable and probable grounds) or the more
rigorous Part VI authorization (otherwise known as a “wiretap”
authorization, for which the police must also demonstrate “investigative
necessity”)?
In the 2013 case of TELUS, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that
the police must obtain Part VI authorizations in order to acquire text
32
33

Id., at para. 23.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.).
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messages from service providers on a prospective basis — that is, to
obtain the production of future text messages. Should the standard be any
different for historical text messages? Mr. Jones argued, “no”.34 Why
should it matter whether the police seek judicial permission to acquire
text messages the day before they come into existence, or the day after?
A majority of the Court disagreed with this argument. Writing on
behalf of five justices, Côté J. explained that the distinction between
historical and future communications is a meaningful one under Part VI
of the Criminal Code. The threat posed by the latter is unique because
“when equipped with sophisticated surveillance technologies, the state
may be tempted to embark on forward-looking, ‘fishing expedition[s] in
the hope of uncovering evidence of crime’”.35 Therefore, a Part VI
authorization is required for the latter but not the former.
Interestingly, Rowe J. wrote a separate concurring opinion in which
he agreed with Côté J.’s interpretation of Part VI, but expressed concern
that this enables the police to “in effect sidestep the requirements of Part
VI by obtaining a production order immediately after the messages are
sent.”36 He then explicitly stated that he was expressing “no settled view”
on whether the ability of the police to obtain historical text messages
with a production order (and not a Part VI authorization) is constitutional
under section 8 of the Charter. It may not take long for enterprising
defence counsel to see if they can get Rowe J. (or at least a judge of a
lower court) to answer this question. Jones concerned the proper
interpretation of Part VI of the Criminal Code, and not its
constitutionality.
Jones also raised a second, more general issue concerning the
litigation of section 8 Charter claims: in seeking to establish a subjective
reasonable expectation of privacy (which is one of the requirements for
standing under section 8), does the defence have to lead evidence? Or
can the defence rely on the Crown’s theory of the case? This has been a
long-debated issue that often arises in drug possession cases. If the police
find cocaine in a home, for instance, does A have to testify that he lives
in the home in order to obtain standing to challenge the search of the
home? Or can A simply rely on the Crown’s theory that he lives there,
which is why he is being prosecuted in the first place?
34
The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, for which the author was counsel,
supported this position.
35
Jones, supra, note 3, at para. 74.
36
Id., at para. 85 (emphasis in original).
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Justice Côté’s majority opinion endorsed the latter approach.37 This is
a significant decision for the criminal defence bar, who will no longer
have to risk calling their client in a Charter voir dire to establish
standing. While evidence in a voir dire is not automatically admissible in
the trial proper, an admission at the voir dire can restrict the permissible
scope of defence evidence and submissions at trial.38 This is a gamble
that defence counsel will no longer have to contemplate.

V. NEXT STEPS: REEVES AND MILLS
Marakah and Jones are two of the biggest section 8 Charter cases in a
long time. Nonetheless, they do not answer all of the pressing digital
privacy questions related to text communications. Less than one week
after the Supreme Court released its judgments, the Court granted leave
to appeal in two cases that will answer further questions about text
message privacy and section 8 in general: R. v. Reeves39 and R. v. Mills.40
1. Reeves — Who Can Consent?
Reeves will require the Court to confront the thorny issue of third
party consent, last dealt with by the Supreme Court in Cole. Consenting
to a police search is the equivalent of waiving one’s right to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizure. In order to be valid, it must be
voluntary and informed. Thus, in Cole, the Court held that the School
Board, which owned the laptop used by the accused school teacher, could
not validly consent to a police search of the laptop’s contents. Only the
school teacher, as the user of the laptop and therefore the one with an
expectation of privacy in its contents, could validly consent to a search.
The School Board was a “third party”. The Court emphatically rejected
the American “third party consent” doctrine in Canada.41
In Reeves, the police seized a family computer that was co-owned by
the accused and his spouse. The question was whether his spouse alone
37

Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 24.
39
[2017] S.C.C.A. No. 275 (S.C.C.). The appeal was heard on May 17, 2018 and judgment
was reserved.
40
[2017] S.C.C.A. No. 125 (S.C.C.). The appeal was heard on May 25, 2018 and judgment
was reserved. The author was counsel to the Criminal Lawyers’ Association with Annamaria
Enenajor.
41
Cole, supra, note 10, at paras. 75-79.
38
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could consent to the seizure. The Crown sought to distinguish Cole on
the basis that the consenting party in that case (the School Board
employer) did not have an “equal and overlapping privacy interest” in
the subject of the search (the School Board-owned laptop) with the
accused (a school teacher). The School Board’s privacy interest was in
the hardware (the physical device) rather than the software (the
informational contents of the device). By contrast, so the argument went,
the spouse’s privacy interests and the accused’s privacy interests in
Reeves were coterminous.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the spouse’s consent was valid,
but purported to do so on a different basis from that advanced by the
Crown. Rather than decide whether one party can waive the constitutional
rights of another, the Court re-defined the scope of the accused’s
reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore his constitutional right. It
would have been within the accused’s “reasonable expectations” that his
spouse might have “a legitimate interest in consenting to police access to
the shared space and property.”42
The Supreme Court heard the appeal in Reeves on May 17, 2018 and
reserved judgment. How it decides the issue could have implications not
just for police searches of shared computers, but also for searches of text
messages. In Marakah, the Crown repeatedly raised this problem scenario:
what happens when someone receives a threatening text message and
wants to report it to the police? Can the recipient of that text consent to its
seizure by the police? One way to answer this question would have been to
adopt the line of reasoning advanced by the Crown in Reeves. Both the
sender and recipient of the text message have equal and overlapping
privacy interests in the electronic conversation; therefore, either party
alone can validly consent. Neither the sender nor the recipient is a “third
party”, so the argument goes. Rather, they are both “first parties”.43
This argument was made in Marakah but McLachlin C.J.C. did not
accept it. Neither did she explicitly reject it. Rather, she merely observed
that where an individual receives a threatening text message and alerts
the police to its existence, the police can comply with section 8 by
obtaining a warrant.44 Of course, a warrant would only be necessary
where there is no valid consent.
42

R. v. Reeves, [2017] O.J. No. 3038, 2017 ONCA 365, at para. 62 (S.C.C.).
Indeed, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association advanced this position at the Supreme Court
in Marakah, supra, note 2.
44
Id., at para. 50. This argument was made by the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association, for which the author was counsel.
43
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Whether Marakah will be interpreted as having rejected the notion
that the recipient of a text message can unilaterally consent to its
seizure by the police may be clarified when the Court decides Reeves.
Should the Court conduct a full-scale analysis of the law of consent,
one hopes that it will keep the following stages of the section 8
analysis distinct:
1. Is there state action? The Charter applies to state action. Where the
state actor is merely a passive recipient of information, such as in the
case of a victim who reports a threatening text message to the police,
it is questionable whether the Charter applies.45 The situation would
be different, however, where the victim chooses not to report the
threat but the police discover it through some other means, and then
attempt to seize the text message from the victim. In the latter
scenario, the state is not merely a passive recipient of information
but is actively seeking it out. Therefore, the Charter should apply.
2. Does the state action invade a reasonable expectation of privacy? If
there is state action, the next question is whether that state action
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy such that there is a
search or seizure within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter. The
test for answering this question is the totality of the circumstances
test established in R. v. Edwards46 and adapted to the informational
privacy context in Spencer.47
3. Who can consent to the privacy invasion? It is only after the first
two questions are answered that the Court should move onto this
third question. If there is state action so as to engage the Charter,
and that state action invades a reasonable expectation of privacy,
then section 8 of the Charter is engaged — and the individual
whose privacy is invaded has the right to waive his or her section 8
rights by consenting to a police search. It is difficult to see how
another party, however, can waive these rights on that individual’s
behalf — even if the two parties have “equal and overlapping”
privacy interests.

45
See Doherty J.A.’s analysis in R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, [2017] O.J. No. 4143, 2017
ONCA 649, at para. 34 (Ont. C.A.).
46
[1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). Note that this test may be revisited in
Le, supra, note 19.
47
Spencer, supra, note 13, at paras. 17-21.
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2. Mills — What About Undercover Officers?
A different but related issue is raised by Mills. What if the recipient of a
text message is an undercover police officer? Can that police officer capture
the text message as he is receiving it and, by doing so, seize the
communication for investigative purposes? If this were a phone call, the
undercover police officer would have to obtain prior judicial authorization
before recording the call. The Supreme Court decided that in Duarte nearly
30 years ago.48 Should the law be any different for a text communication?
The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal answered “yes”. It
held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages sent to an undercover officer. But it did so on the basis that “as
the sender of such communications, Mr. Mills must have known that he
lost control over any expectation of confidentiality” and “took a risk when
he voluntarily communicated with someone he did not know”.49 This sort
of risk analysis is similar to the line of reasoning that McLachlin C.J.C.
rejected in Marakah.50 Other lower court cases have reached the same
conclusion applying the same, now-discredited reasoning.51 These cases
should have little currency in the post-Marakah world.
The only fact that separates the text communications in Mills from
those in Marakah is the fact that Mr. Mills had never physically met the
undercover officer with whom he was communicating. In that sense, the
recipient of the text messages was a “stranger”. This should not, however,
negate a reasonable expectation of privacy. One can imagine any number
of intensely private electronic conversations that individuals have with
those whom they have never met in person. This happens every day with
online dating. It happens when Canadians seek medical advice from an
online doctor.52 It happens every time a prospective client sends an e-mail
to a lawyer seeking legal assistance. It would be strange if these electronic
communications did not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy simply
because the parties had never met in person.53
48

Supra, note 16.
R. v. Mills, [2017] N.J. No. 55, 2017 NLCA 12, at para. 23 (N.L.C.A.).
50
Marakah, supra, note 2, at paras. 45, 68.
51
R. v. Allen, [2017] O.J. No. 4239, 2017 ONSC 1712, at para. 46 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Ghotra,
[2015] O.J. No. 7253, at para. 125 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Merritt, [2017] O.J. No. 6928, 2017 ONSC 1648, at
para. 46 (Ont. S.C.J.). See contra, R. v. Kwok, [2008] O.J. No. 2414, at paras. 19, 22 (Ont. C.J.).
52
CBC News, “Online doctor consultations take off in Canada” (July 12, 2017), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/virtual-medical-consults-1.4200397>.
53
See Steven Penney, “Consent Searches for Electronic Text Communications: Escaping the ZeroSum Trap” (May 8, 2018), online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=>, at 25-26 [hereinafter “Penney”].
49
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TELUS provides another important reference point for the issue in
Mills. In TELUS, the plurality held that police have to obtain judicial
authorization (under Part VI) to acquire copies of text messages from a
telecommunications provider on a prospective basis. The only difference
between that technique and what the police did in Mills is that, in the case
of the latter, the police cut out the middleman. Rather than going through a
telecommunications provider, the police acquired copies of text messages
by virtue of being a party to the conversation itself. In both cases, the
police engaged in communications surveillance. The distinction is simply
that of third party surveillance (TELUS) versus participant surveillance
(Mills). Duarte tells us that is a distinction without a difference when it
comes to the applicability of section 8 of the Charter.54
If the Supreme Court overturns the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in
Mills, as it should, police will generally need to obtain judicial
authorization before exchanging and recording text messages with an
investigative target. The applicable provision would be section 184.2(1)
in Part VI of the Criminal Code. This provision was enacted after the
Court decided Duarte in 1990. It applies when the police seek to
“intercept” a “private communication” — even when the officer doing
the intercepting is a participant to the communication.
Section 183 of the Criminal Code defines “intercept” broadly to
include the acts of “listen[ing] to, record[ing] or acquir[ing] a
communication or acquir[ing] the substance, meaning or purport
thereof”. It would therefore capture the act of an undercover officer
participating in and recording a text communication with the
investigative target. And in TELUS, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that text messages are “private communications”.55
To apply Part VI in this manner should not unduly hamper the ability
of the police to combat crimes such as child luring. It’s true that police
would not be able to use private text communications to develop
reasonable and probable grounds; they would need those grounds at the
outset before they engage in any private text communications. But this
would not prevent the police from developing the requisite grounds in a
public chatroom. Electronic communications in public chatrooms are
54
Duarte, supra, note 16, at para. 28. Parliament has since recognized that we have a
stronger expectation of privacy against third party surveillance. Thus, investigative necessity is an
added requirement for third party interceptions under the Criminal Code, s. 186, but is not a
requirement for one-party consent authorizations under s. 184.2. See Penney, id., at 35.
55
Supra, note 14, at para. 12, per Abella J., at para. 67, per Moldaver J., and at para. 135,
per Cromwell J.
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arguably not private communications under Part VI, nor would they attract
the protections of section 8 of the Charter. Indeed, McLachlin C.J.C.
referred specifically to messages exchanged in “crowded Internet chat
rooms” as one type of electronic communication that may fall outside the
scope of Marakah. Therefore, police would be free to exchange messages
in this environment without any grounds. They would only need the grounds
to obtain judicial authorization (under Criminal Code, section 184.2) when
they choose to move the communication from a public chatroom into a
private, one-to-one context. Many child luring investigations proceed in
exactly this manner.56

VI. BEYOND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Marakah’s ramifications will not be limited to the criminal law. Its
impacts will likely be felt in at least two other areas: regulatory
investigations and the development of the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion.
Regulatory investigations will be affected because the Charter applies
to all government entities, including both police conducting criminal
investigations and regulatory bodies conducting regulatory investigations.
Of course, the way in which the Charter applies may differ in the
regulatory context as compared to the criminal context. In a number of
cases in the early- to mid-90s, the Supreme Court of Canada relaxed the
ordinary Hunter v. Southam standards for a reasonable search and seizure
under section 8 (“prior judicial authorization” and “reasonable and
probable grounds”) in the regulatory context.57 In each of these cases,
however, context was a proxy for privacy. Inspections of business
records did not have to meet the ordinary standards of section 8 because
they engaged a lower expectation of privacy.58 But as Wilson J. wrote in
56
R. v. Legare, [2009] S.C.J. No. 56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551, at para. 8 (S.C.C.); R. v. Thain,
[2009] O.J. No. 1022, 2009 ONCA 223, at para. 2 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pengelley, [2010] O.J.
No. 4174, 2010 ONSC 5488, at para. 2 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Ghotra, [2016] O.J. No. 1688, 2016
ONSC 5675, at para. 51 (Ont. S.C.J.).
57
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
58
See, for example, Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and
Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425
(S.C.C.); British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] S.C.J. No. 32, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also Cole, supra, note 10, at paras. 70-71, wherein Fish J. referred to a
number of cases in the early 2000s, including R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, 2002 SCC 73
(S.C.C.), and characterized them as follows: “... In each instance, given the regulated nature of the
documents in question, the individual claiming the protection of s. 8 did not have a reasonable
expectation of preventing or controlling the further dissemination of his or her information to the law
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R. v. McKinlay Transport, “[t]he greater the intrusion into the privacy
interests of an individual, the more likely it will be that safeguards akin
to those in Hunter will be required.”59 Therefore, in the subsequent case
of Baron v. Canada, the Court held that where the state seeks to do
something as intrusive as searching a private residence, the state must
obtain prior judicial authorization even though the search is conducted
for a regulatory (and not criminal) purpose.60
Following this reasoning, where a regulatory body seeks access to
private text communications, which can reveal our most intimate
thoughts and feelings, it may be argued that section 8 of the Charter
should apply with close to full force. In most cases, this will require the
regulatory body to obtain prior judicial authorization on the basis of
“reasonable grounds” before searching or seizing the text communications
regardless of whose device is targeted.
Marakah may also affect the development of the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion. The tort is made out where (i) the defendant’s conduct is
intentional (or reckless); (ii) the defendant invades, “without lawful
justification”, the plaintiff’s private areas or concerns; and (iii) “a
reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing
distress, humiliation, or anguish.”61
In establishing this tort, the Ontario Court of Appeal cited the right to
privacy in section 8 of the Charter and the need for the common law to
evolve in accordance with Charter values.62 It follows that the courts
should also develop the tort in accordance with section 8 case law —
including, most recently, Marakah. Accordingly, where a business
enforcement branch of the state.” Each of these cases involved documents created and maintained in
a highly regulatory environment. They did not involve something as inherently private as private
communications.
59
[1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, at 649 (S.C.C.).
60
[1993] S.C.J. No. 6, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, at paras. 37-40 (S.C.C.). See, however, Law
Society of Alberta v. Sidhu, [2017] A.J. No. 691, 2017 ABCA 224 (Alta. C.A.). In Sidhu, the Law
Society investigator requested that the Appellant produce access to records related to his desktop
computers, laptops, iPads, tablets, cellular telephones, etc. The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the
Appellant had a lower expectation of privacy in the contents of his devices because he was a
regulated legal professional — even though searches of digital devices are ordinarily considered
highly invasive. The Court wrote that (at para. 20) “[w]ith the regulatory context comes an
attenuated expectation of privacy because there is an awareness and acceptance that the regulator
will be involved in the life and practice of that field”. This applies to information stored on digital
devices even though such information may engage details related to the regulated individual’s
personal life because “[t]he power of investigation in professional misconduct extends to a
professional’s personal life that reflects on their integrity” (at para. 23).
61
Jones v. Tsige, [2012] O.J. No. 148, 2012 ONCA 32, at para. 71 (Ont. C.A.).
62
Id., at para. 46.
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intentionally or recklessly accesses private text communications
(including e-mail) without lawful justification, it may find itself on the
receiving end of an intrusion upon seclusion claim. And where that claim
is in the form of a class proceeding,63 the class may include not just the
employees or accountholders whose text communications were accessed,
but all those with whom they were communicating. This could
significantly enlarge the class and therefore the liability that a defendant
may face.
Even where a business does not intentionally or recklessly access
private text communications, but merely stores them in a manner making
them vulnerable to hackers, that may be the subject of an intrusion upon
seclusion claim. In the recent case of Agnew-Americano v. Equifax
Canada Inc., the Court held that it was neither “frivolous” nor “fanciful”
to base an intrusion upon seclusion claim on the mere creation of risk of
allowing hackers access to unauthorized information.64

VII. CONCLUSION
Texting is paradoxically the most discreet and most recorded form of
communication. Like many activities we now engage in with our
smartphones, we are addicted to the convenience, recognize the risks of
our information leaking out to the public, and expect everyone to act
responsibly to prevent those leaks — all at the same time. The law
should develop in accordance with these evolving social norms. While
one can criticize the Court for not going far enough in Jones, we are
fortunate to have a Supreme Court that has (for the most part) led with
wisdom in this area. As Côté J. put it in the companion case of Jones, “...
Canadians are not required to become digital recluses in order to
maintain some semblance of privacy in their lives.”65 One hopes that the
Court will continue this trend in the upcoming cases of Reeves and Mills.

63
See, e.g., Bennett v. Lenovo (Canada) Inc., [2017] O.J. No. 784, 2017 ONSC 1082, at
paras. 17-23 (Ont. S.C.J.).
64
[2018] O.J. No. 361, 2018 ONSC 275, at paras. 138-163 (Ont. S.C.J.). The precedential
value of this decision may be limited because it was merely a “carriage” ruling in a class proceeding.
65
Jones, supra, note 3, at para. 45.

